The People’s Mojahedin of Iran (MEK), a prominent Iranian dissident group, has disclosed details about a secret site allegedly used by Iran to store and prepare missiles for use against adversaries, sale to allies, and provision to proxies.

Located in a mountainous area outside of Eshtehard City, northwest of Tehran in Alborz province, the facility, known as the Shahid (Martyr) Soltani Garrison, is heavily secured and surrounded by double layers of barbed wire. The MEK reports increased activity in the latter half of 2024, with over ten trailers carrying missile components entering the camp in July.

The MEK claims the site houses a variety of ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-3, Qiam, Fateh, and Fath series.

Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, observes that following Iran’s layered attack on Israel in April, involving roughly 300 drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, the Islamic Regime has shifted focus, eliminating low- and slow-flying assets and prioritizing ballistic weapons. On October 1, Iran launched over 180 ballistic missiles into Israeli airspace.

Taleblu notes that Iran employed the same liquid-propellant systems from the April attack, the Emad and Ghadr ballistic missiles, which are advanced versions of the Shahab-3. The October attack also involved the solid-propellant Kheibar Shekan and reportedly even the hypersonic Fattah-1 ballistic missile. An Israel Defense Forces spokesperson confirmed to Digital that Iran’s recent attacks included Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 hypersonic ballistic missiles.

During the broader October 1 attack on Israel, approximately a dozen Iranian missiles were launched. Digital reached out to the Pentagon and the Defense Intelligence Agency to inquire whether American assets have been targeted by the various Iranian ballistic missiles reportedly stored at the Eshtehard site, or whether the U.S. has intercepted any of these missiles in the region. Both agencies declined to comment.

To defend Israel from further Iranian ballistic missile attacks, the U.S. deployed its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Tel Aviv, along with a contingent of 100 U.S. soldiers to operate it. Taleblu posits that THAAD will serve as a critical addition to Israel’s already robust air-missile defense network. However, with only 48 interceptors, Taleblu questions the long-term viability of THAAD.

It is unknown whether ballistic missiles targeting Israel were stored or prepared at the Shahid Soltani Garrison. It is also unclear if the short-range ballistic missiles Iran provided to Russia, for which Iran was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury and State departments, were kept at this location.

The MEK provided satellite imagery showcasing two distinct sections of the Shahid Soltani Garrison. Above-ground storage facilities “were established at least 15 years ago” and include a segment of single-story warehouses and one three-story warehouse, offering a combined 6,500 square meters of storage space. Approximately 10 buildings in another segment of the garrison provide an additional 3,000 square meters of space. Underground tunnels constructed on the site between 2017 and 2021 offer further storage locations.

According to the report, the Al-Ghadir Missile Command, a unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Aerospace Force, is responsible for the camp. IRGC Brig. Gen. Partovi was the last known commander of the site. The MEK stated that Col. Mohammad Reza Hakimzadeh and Col. Barati of the Eshtehard Corps of the IRGC are responsible for administrative affairs related to the camp.

In 2010, the Al-Ghadir Missile Command was . as well as by the EU. Commanders within Al-Ghadir Missile Command, including Mahmoud Bagheri Kazemabad and Mohammad Agha Jafari, have also been subject to U.S. sanctions.

Ballistic missiles of probable and confirmed Iranian origin have previously targeted U.S. forces. Iran-backed militias launched an unknown at Al Asad Air Base on Nov. 21, 2023, resulting in eight injuries and damage to infrastructure.

On Jan. 8, 2020, Iran launched 27 theater ballistic missiles toward Al Asad Air Base. Of these, 11 Fateh and Qiam missiles landed inside the U.S. base, according to a medical study of the attack’s effects. The missiles’ impact resulted in around 35 cases of traumatic brain injury or concussion.

Taleblu emphasizes that countering Iran’s ballistic missile program necessitates a multifaceted approach. This involves economic and political measures, including curbing Iran’s trade with China, disrupting Iran’s domestic and foreign supply chains, and imposing travel bans and sanctions on individuals involved in the ballistic missile program. When combined with covert or kinetic operations, these efforts “can really handcuff this missile program,” Taleblu explains.

Taleblu underscores the importance of maintaining advanced missile defense systems to deter Iranian weapons, bolstering the security of U.S. bases, and ensuring “the elements of deterrence by punishment are not only present, but are understood and are credible.”

Alireza Jafarzadeh, deputy director of the National Council of Resistance of Iran’s Washington office, presents a different perspective. He argues that “true democracy in Iran and peace and tranquility in the region depend on the regime’s downfall, a responsibility that lies with the Iranian people and their organized resistance.”

“depends on exporting terrorism and belligerence while brutally oppressing the Iranian people,” Jafarzadeh said. Given that “decades of appeasement have emboldened this dictatorship,” he calls for enforcement of “the terror designation of the IRGC and Ministry of Intelligence and Security” and recommends that “supporting the Iranian youth and Resistance Units to confront the IRGC are crucial steps that the United States and European nations must adopt.”