Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Friday in a historic visit to Ukraine. This comes a month and a half after Modi’s visit to Moscow for talks with President Vladimir Putin.

Officials in both India and Ukraine have stated that the visit will focus on strengthening economic ties and collaboration in areas like defense, science, and technology.

However, analysts believe the visit could also be an attempt by India to adopt a more neutral stance after being perceived as leaning towards Russia. This perception stems from India’s longstanding relationship with Russia dating back to the Cold War era, and New Delhi’s reluctance to openly criticize Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.

Modi’s visit marks the first time a Prime Minister of India has visited Ukraine since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries over 30 years ago. He is scheduled to arrive in Kyiv following a two-day visit to Poland.

Analysts suggest that the timing of the trip is intended to manage the repercussions of Modi’s visit to Russia in July.

That visit, which coincided with a NATO leaders’ gathering in Washington and a deadly missile strike in Ukraine, drew significant criticism from Zelenskyy. He described Modi’s meeting with Putin as “a huge disappointment” and “a devastating blow to peace efforts,” particularly after witnessing the Indian leader embracing Putin.

While Modi did not directly address the missile strikes, he acknowledged the bloodshed while seated next to Putin and condemned any attacks harming innocent civilians.

K C Singh, a strategic affairs expert and former diplomat, views this week’s Ukraine trip as India’s attempt to “balance the situation” after appearing to “tilt towards Russia.”

Indian officials are downplaying any connection between the Moscow trip and the current visit. Secretary (West) Tanmaya Lal stated this week, “This is not a zero-sum game… these are independent, broad ties.”

Despite pressure from the West, New Delhi has refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion or voting against it in UN resolutions. India has maintained a neutral stance, urging Ukraine and Russia to resolve the conflict through dialogue.

Derek Grossman, an Indo-Pacific analyst at the RAND Corporation, believes Modi’s visit aims, to some extent, to demonstrate that New Delhi’s strategic orientation remains non-aligned, thus maintaining a balance in its foreign policy.

India and Russia have enjoyed strong ties since the Cold War, and Moscow’s reliance on New Delhi as a key trading partner has increased since the Kremlin launched its military operation in Ukraine in February 2022.

Following sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies that effectively blocked Russian exports from most Western markets, India, along with China, has become a significant buyer of Russian oil.

Analysts viewed Modi’s visit to Moscow as a reinforcement of their partnership, particularly considering Russia’s crucial role as a trade and defense partner. Notably, approximately 60% of India’s military systems and hardware are of Russian origin, and New Delhi now sources over 40% of its oil imports from Russia.

Trade between the two countries has also witnessed a substantial increase, reaching close to $65 billion in the 2023-24 financial year, according to India’s foreign ministry.

Bilateral trade between India and Ukraine was significantly lower, at around $3 billion prior to the invasion. However, Modi and Zelenskyy have engaged on the sidelines of global events, and Ukraine’s foreign minister also visited New Delhi earlier this year.

India has also provided several shipments of humanitarian aid to Ukraine since the invasion.

Analysts believe it is unlikely that Zelenskyy will publicly raise Modi’s meeting with Putin.

However, Chietigj Bajpaee, who researches South Asia at the Chatham House think tank, asserts that Modi’s Moscow visit and the India-Russia relationship will constitute a “strong undertone” to his Ukraine trip, even if not explicitly mentioned in public statements.

Grossman expects the trip to be well-received in the U.S. and other Western countries that had been critical of Modi’s meeting with Putin in July.

Grossman further adds that for Modi, this trip presents an opportunity to “engage Zelenskyy, secure Indian interests there, and appease the West.”

While the visit may offer some reassurance to the West, Bajpaee emphasizes that India maintains a closer relationship with Moscow, and “Modi’s visit will not alter this perception.”

It is unlikely that Modi will use this visit to seek a role for India as a peacemaker in the conflict, a possibility that some had speculated at the outset of the war considering New Delhi’s ties to Russia and its growing global stature.

Grossman states that “Indian behavior… has been to try to stay out of resolving it, and to only occasionally comment against further aggression.” He adds that India, unlike China or Turkey, has not proposed a peace plan, for example.

Bajpaee notes that the Kremlin will observe Modi’s visit, “but short of any statements that are highly critical of Russia, it is unlikely to be concerned.”