The White House is scheduled to host a meeting between President and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Monday, with a key challenge being discussions about Gaza’s potential future post-Hamas.

According to experts interviewed by Digital, although the necessity for a replacement governance structure is evident, nearly all suggested options face significant structural, political, and security obstacles.

John Hannah, a senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) with experience in both Republican and Democratic administrations, stated that establishing an alternative to Hamas needs to occur concurrently with its dissolution.

“A crucial component of success involves demonstrating a workable alternative,” Hannah remarked, adding, “The public requires assurance of a future beyond Hamas.”

Experts suggest this future involves a technocratic government in Gaza, independent of Hamas, composed of Palestinians not linked to either Hamas or the PLO, and supported by a coalition of influential Arab nations such as , Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE.

Hannah indicated that while an independent new administration for Gaza is preferable, a symbolic connection to the Palestinian Authority could bolster its legitimacy among Arab states. He suggested Ramallah might facilitate salary payments, but emphasized the PA would not be in charge.

“Currently, if Israel withdraws from Gaza, Hamas remains the default power,” stated Ghaith al-Omari, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He further noted, “There are no local actors capable of opposing them, and Arab participation is contingent on Hamas’s defeat, not merely a ceasefire, but complete disarmament.”

Al-Omari, formerly the executive director of the American Task Force on Palestine, suggested that at most, the PA could provide a “kosher stamp” to appease Arab states, which have explicitly stated their involvement in Gaza would only occur under a Palestinian national framework.

“If that symbolic invitation from the PA is absent, will not participate,” al-Omari explained. “However, they also require a political structure, including a commitment to a two-state solution. Without this, they lack any motivation to engage in Gaza.”

Obtaining Israel’s approval for any prospective Gaza administration presents a significant obstacle. An Israeli security official informed Digital that any agreement would mandate assurances allowing Israel continued counterterrorism access to preclude Hamas’s resurgence.

Hannah described this as akin to the existing arrangement in the West Bank, involving “buffer zones, perimeter security, and the IDF or Shin Bet’s authority to act on intelligence as required.”

He further observed that such a framework would necessitate vigorous American-led diplomatic efforts, coupled with continuous presence and coordination.

Hannah asserted, “I do not foresee anyone other than the United States undertaking this, given the numerous inter-Arab rivalries.” He elaborated that “no other entity possesses the connections, resources, or credibility necessary to reconcile the profound divisions among Israel, Arab nations, and global stakeholders. All parties will seek U.S. leadership in this endeavor, and President Trump’s desire to resolve it is clear.”

“Qatar represents a significant unspoken issue,” Hannah stated. “While they provide substantial and much-needed funding, their relationship with Hamas has been highly problematic. If they wish to participate, it must be under stringent conditions, with funds channeled through reliable, externally managed mechanisms. However, they cannot assume a central role in this undertaking.”

Meanwhile, the United Nations is mostly excluded from a direct role. “They cannot manage education or the economy in Gaza any longer,” Hannah remarked. He added that “at best, the U.N. could potentially endorse a U.S.-Arab-Israeli initiative through a Security Council resolution, but will not assume an operational function.”

A concept quietly gaining support within Israeli and American diplomatic circles is the proposition of enabling local clans to form self-governing territories.

Joseph Braude, president of the Center for Peace Communications, who has had extensive discussions with on-the-ground activists, opines that this model could signal the commencement of an alternative approach.

Braude suggested that “discussing a single civil administration right now might be unrealistic,” but posited that “within distinct geographical areas of the strip, non-Hamas self-governance could be piloted, with local Gazans patrolling internally while the IDF or another force secures the perimeter.”

He further added, “Gaza possesses a core of educated, civically engaged individuals, including engineers and teachers, who are not Islamists.” He noted that “if thoroughly vetted, these individuals are capable of managing administration, education, and essential services, but the initial step involves identifying them and understanding their true beliefs.”

Braude cited Yasser Abu Shabab, a local militia leader, as an example. He described him as “the first anti-Hamas militia to appear in Gaza in a generation,” noting that “he is a local fighter from a Bedouin clan with familial connections to Egyptian forces combating ISIS in Sinai, and states his intention to invite civil servants to start forming an administration.”

However, this approach does not garner universal agreement on its feasibility. Al-Omari commented, “These factions are fragmented, dislocated, and lack the legitimacy or unity required for governance.” He added, “While these militias might be utilized to ensure aid distribution in particular zones, they cannot serve as the foundation for governing.”

Dr. Michael Milstein, head of the Forum for Palestinian Studies at Tel Aviv University, informed Digital that “since the conflict commenced, various efforts to advance clans as a substitute for Hamas have similarly proven unsuccessful, citing the Doghmush clan, whose leaders were executed by Hamas in early 2024.”

Milstein further observed, “Even currently, individuals such as Abu Shabab in Rafah or the Barbakh family in Khan Younis represent isolated instances.” He emphasized that “Hamas retains control over the majority of public areas. Clans, while potentially providing localized remedies, do not constitute a unified or legitimate alternative, and many openly demonstrate allegiance to Hamas.”

Braude noted, “Many contend that lasting peace will not be achieved until Palestinians instill in their children a greater self-love than their hatred for Israel.” He acknowledged this as true but questioned, “Who is actively engaged in cultivating a [that] achieves this? That is both the current challenge and the opportunity.”