The Taliban brings back painful recollections for India. The Islamist group was implicated in India’s most severe plane hijacking in 1999 and the 2008 assault on the Indian embassy in Kabul, which resulted in the deaths of multiple Indian nationals, among others. These incidents, along with others, make the current visit of Afghan Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to Delhi particularly noteworthy.

Muttaqi, who remains under U.N. sanctions, required a special exemption to enter India last Thursday for a week-long stay. India acknowledged him as Afghanistan’s foreign minister, permitted him to conduct meetings at the Afghan embassy in Delhi—still staffed by personnel from the former Western-supported administration—and saw its own foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, appear alongside him. Delhi is also set to reopen its embassy in Kabul shortly.

However, while Muttaqi was undertaking a public relations campaign in India and engaging with Indian officials, fresh skirmishes broke out along the Durand Line separating Pakistan and Afghanistan recently. This timing, coinciding with Muttaqi’s visit to India—a key adversary of Pakistan—highlights the intricate geopolitical dynamics between India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Why is Delhi reaching out to Kabul?

India has sustained engagement with the Taliban since its assumption of power four years prior. Nevertheless, a sequence of regional occurrences has instigated the current, unparalleled shift in India’s approach to the Taliban. The armed conflict between India and Pakistan earlier this year, China’s robust and expanding backing for Pakistan, Russia’s support for that conflict despite its close ties to India, and Washington’s recent reconciliation with Pakistan have all generated a sense of unease and encirclement in Delhi.

Delhi finds itself with limited allies or dependable partners across a significant portion of the Indian subcontinent, stretching from the Rann of Kutch along the Gujarat border to Kashmir in the north, China to its northeast, and other South Asian nations including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bhutan. Afghanistan holds considerable importance within this geopolitical landscape, and the Taliban appears open to cooperation.

Despite this, Delhi’s engagement with the Taliban has drawn significant condemnation due to its human rights track record. The controversy arising from a press conference that barred female journalists served as a stark example. Nevertheless, a burgeoning perspective within Delhi suggests that foreign policy ought to be pragmatic, driven by national interests rather than moral imperatives. Delhi has consistently prioritized strategic advantages above all else—cultivating relations with controversial entities, refraining from public censure of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, pursuing contentious partnerships, and moving closer to formally recognizing the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. The prevailing sentiment in Delhi is that it should collaborate with the de facto rulers of any nation. Muttaqi’s reception in Delhi exemplifies this rationale.

The Delhi-Kabul-Islamabad balance of power

The current engagement between India and the Taliban gains added significance due to Pakistan’s involvement. Without this factor, Delhi might not have pursued relations with the Taliban so eagerly. Three capitals exhibit three distinct, competing motivations. Islamabad is wary of a closer defense and security alliance forming between two antagonistic states situated on either side of its territory. Kabul aims to counterbalance its deteriorating relationship with its former benefactor, Islamabad, which accuses the Taliban of harboring militants responsible for lethal attacks within Pakistan. Delhi’s objectives include re-establishing historical ties with Afghanistan, securing potential economic opportunities, and establishing a friendly presence on Pakistan’s western flank, offering potential strategic advantages.

These conflicting aims have led to divergent approaches. Islamabad endeavors to create a division between Delhi and Kabul or, at best, to exert control over the Taliban. Kabul seeks to enhance collaboration with India, which also shares an antagonistic relationship with Pakistan, as the Taliban continues its pursuit of formal international recognition as Afghanistan’s government. Delhi aims to engage with the prevailing authority in Afghanistan to serve as a counterweight to Pakistan.

Essentially, Delhi and Kabul subscribe to the notion that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend,’ while Islamabad perceives a strategic partnership between nations on its borders as detrimental to its own interests.

Given these intricate three-way dynamics, Delhi is poised to further elevate its relationship with the Taliban regime and support its efforts to achieve greater independence from Pakistani influence. Conversely, while Pakistan historically played a pivotal role in aiding the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul, an Afghanistan that cultivates more international friendships is not in Pakistan’s best interest. Such a development could undermine Islamabad’s sway over Afghan affairs, including control over the 1,600-mile international border it seeks to renegotiate. All border crossings between Afghanistan and Pakistan were closed following recent skirmishes.

In this context, by hosting Muttaqi, Delhi may have exacerbated the widening rift between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which was evident during the recent border clashes. Islamabad is now more inclined to view Delhi’s increasing cordiality with the Taliban as a genuine threat to Pakistan’s interests, irrespective of Delhi’s actual intentions.

Among the broader Indian public, however, the strengthening ties between Delhi and the Taliban are drawing scrutiny. Nevertheless, Delhi will likely continue to navigate a delicate balance between these public concerns and its ambition to foster stronger regional alliances at Pakistan’s expense.