Former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro was found guilty on Thursday of attempting to remain in power after his defeat in the 2022 election. He received a sentence of 27 years in prison. This decision is unprecedented in both Brazilian and Latin American history. It also places Brazil at the forefront of global initiatives to combat the erosion of democratic principles.

The impact of Bolsonaro’s conviction on U.S.-Brazilian relations will not be known for some time. President Donald Trump, who described the verdict as “unfair,” had months prior ensured the trial would draw global attention by threatening new tariffs on many Brazilian goods in retaliation for what he called a “politically motivated witch hunt.” His Treasury Department also sanctioned Alexandre de Moraes, the Brazilian Supreme Court Justice overseeing the trial, following lobbying from Bolsonaro’s son Eduardo who resides in the U.S.

Assessing the trial’s long-term effects on Brazilian democracy will take even longer. Brazil is deeply polarized, and the trial intensified existing political tensions. This polarization was clearly demonstrated on the eve of the trial’s commencement, when tens of thousands of Brazilians took to the streets to voice their opinions both for and against Bolsonaro’s prosecution.

For now, however, a more pressing task is to understand how Brazil successfully executed this prosecution. After all, the recent experience in the U.S. highlights the inherent difficulties in prosecuting a former president, even as many within the Justice Department pressed for accountability regarding the obstruction of the peaceful transfer of power following the 2020 election.

No single factor fully explains Bolsonaro’s successful prosecution. Instead, it resulted from a blend of legal, political, and societal elements. The primary factor is the assertion of judicial power by the Federal Supreme Court and the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). During the Bolsonaro era, these institutions demonstrated exceptional independence in their pursuit of accountability.

Before the 2022 elections, the TSE issued a list of 20 rebuttals to Bolsonaro’s electoral claims, characterizing them as “false and untrue.” In 2023, the TSE charged Bolsonaro with making unfounded claims of electoral fraud. It eventually barred him from running for office until 2030 over abuse of power.

In February, following an extensive two-year investigation, Brazil’s chief prosecutor indicted Bolsonaro for an alleged plot to assassinate Lula two weeks before he took office. On Thursday, a five-member panel of the Supreme Court voted 4-1 to convict Bolsonaro on all five charges, including attempting to stage a coup, leading an armed criminal group, and attempting a violent abolition of the democratic rule of law. They also stated he was aware of a plot to assassinate Lula.

But two other factors do not receive as much attention as they should. The first is the inability or unwillingness of the Brazilian right to protect Bolsonaro. Brazil operates under a multiparty system and lacks any entity resembling the U.S. Republican Party. A Republican-controlled Senate acquitted Trump after his second impeachment, thereby enabling his illiberal, backsliding agenda. By contrast, the Brazilian right is fragmented (with at least four parties claiming a conservative identity in the Brazilian Congress) and not particularly loyal to Bolsonaro.

After the results of the 2022 elections were announced, some of Bolsonaro’s most ardent supporters, including then-Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Arthur Lira, quickly acknowledged Lula’s victory. Lira announced, “the will of the majority, as expressed in the polls, can never be contested.” And while many on the right have criticized the prosecution, viewing it as judicial overreach, some conservative politicians with their own presidential ambitions, such as São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas, sought to move past Bolsonaro.  

The second factor is the robust mobilization of Brazil’s civil society. This included opposition political parties, trade unions, human rights organizations, professional associations such as the Brazilian Bar Association, major newspapers, LGBTQ groups, the heads of universities and cultural institutions, and the Brazilian Conference of Bishops. These groups called out Bolsonaro’s false claims about a stolen election. More importantly, they argued that Bolsonaro deserved to be held accountable for endangering democracy. That carries significant weight in Brazil given the country’s recent political history; it lost democracy to a military coup in 1964, with democracy restored in 1985 and a brand-new democratic constitution enacted three years later.

Public opinion data reflects the results of civil society’s efforts. A poll conducted between Sept. 11-12 by the Brazilian polling firm Quaest found that a majority supported the Supreme Court’s decision to prosecute Bolsonaro, including an overwhelming majority to put him under house arrest due to concerns that he might flee Brazil.

It’s common in Brazil to hear concerns that the courts have gained too much power and that this poses a challenge for democracy. Bolsonaro’s sentence has also been criticized as excessive, and his lawyers have stated they will appeal the decision. As the liberal newspaper Folha de S.Paulo put it in an editorial: “Fair conviction, high punishment.” These are discussions for another day. For now, it is important to pause and appreciate what Brazil has achieved.

Clearly, the majority of the credit goes to all the work Brazilians have done since the transition to democracy to strengthen their judicial institutions. But the U.S. also deserves credit. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. democracy promotion efforts in Brazil and across Latin America—under both Democratic and Republican administrations—have bolstered independent judiciaries and upheld the rule of law.

At least in Brazil, Latin America’s largest democracy, these efforts have yielded positive results.