On Friday, President Donald Trump authorized a military strike on an alleged Venezuelan drug-smuggling boat. The operation, which reportedly killed three individuals Trump labeled “male narcoterrorists,” marks the third U.S. strike this month targeting suspected Venezuelan drug vessels. The article argues these attacks are not only potentially unlawful and unconstitutional—as Congress did not explicitly authorize the use of such military force—but also an inherently flawed approach to combating drug smuggling in the Western Hemisphere.

These strikes are accompanied by explicit warnings from the White House. The Administration is demanding that Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, who was indicted in 2020 by the U.S. Justice Department on drug-trafficking charges and now has a bounty on his head, prevent drugs and members of the Tren de Aragua gang from entering the U.S.

Trump’s pronouncements are not mere bluster. The U.S. maintains a naval presence of eight warships in the Caribbean—many positioned off Venezuela’s coast—and possesses substantial intelligence capabilities. Furthermore, with proposed legislation that would grant Trump authority to wage war against anyone he designates a “narcoterrorist,” Washington appears poised for a broader militarization, disturbingly reminiscent of former President George W. Bush’s global war on terror. Such an undertaking risks entangling the U.S. in another costly, protracted conflict, this time predominantly within its own hemisphere.

The Trump Administration’s objective seems clear: to employ U.S. military might to deter Latin American drug cartels from transporting their products northward. However, this strategy is ill-advised because it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the illicit drug trade.

Firstly, experts suggest Venezuela plays a minor role in the overall drug trade. While Colombian criminal organizations have historically used the country as a transit route, Venezuela is not the preferred path for the region’s drug traffickers. Indeed, a 2024 DEA report indicated that approximately 90% of cocaine reaching the U.S. originates from Mexico via Colombia.

The concentration on Venezuela is also expected to further strain relations between Washington and Caracas. Some might question the relevance of this, given their long-standing adversarial relationship. The Trump Administration views Maduro as an illegitimate president who facilitates drug trafficking and inundates the U.S. with cocaine, having implemented a “maximum pressure” strategy against him since Trump’s first term. Maduro, conversely, condemns Washington as an imperial power seeking to overthrow his government.

Despite the existing animosity, the U.S. and Venezuela have, at times, engaged in diplomatic discussions. Trump has continued this trend. During the initial eight months of his second term, Trump dispatched special envoy Richard Grenell to Caracas for talks with Maduro on diverse subjects, including energy, deportation policies, and the status of Americans detained in Venezuela. Some of these meetings yielded notable successes. In January, Grenell returned from Venezuela with a significant breakthrough. In March, Maduro agreed to accept deportees from the U.S. Four months later, a prisoner swap occurred, resulting in the release of 10 U.S. citizens and permanent residents in exchange for approximately 250 Venezuelan migrants sent by the Trump Administration to El Salvador.

However, Maduro will have little incentive to continue cooperating with Trump if he believes Washington is determined to destabilize his regime. Maduro certainly intends to avoid the fate of Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian dictator apprehended by the U.S. during its 1989 invasion and subsequently sentenced to 40 years on drug charges. The more the Trump Administration attempts to attribute the drug trafficking problem solely to Maduro, the less motivated he will be to collaborate on other crucial issues, such as migration, which Trump highly prioritizes.

As history consistently demonstrates, no nation can eliminate its drug problem through military force alone. Various governments have previously based their entire anti-drug campaigns on military intervention, only to see them fail. For instance, the Mexican government declared war on cartels in 2006, tasking its military with counter-drug operations. This strategy, however, only led to increased violence from the cartels. The country has since recorded hundreds of thousands of deaths, with the annual toll consistently exceeding 30,000. Mexico’s 2024 election campaign was its deadliest ever, with over three dozen candidates assassinated and many others withdrawing due to safety threats.

Colombia is often hailed as a success story in drug interdiction, but the reality is more nuanced. While Colombian security forces are arguably the most capable in Latin America, largely thanks to the $12 billion in U.S. security assistance provided under the now-defunct Plan Colombia program, the country has registered increasing coca cultivation in recent years—a trend that began even earlier. Indeed, the State Department has once again identified Colombia as a major hub for illicit drugs.

Trump’s military strikes on alleged drug boats on the high seas are unlikely to succeed where previous military-centric efforts have failed. Even if the Trump Administration significantly escalates such attacks, there will, at best, be a temporary disruption as traffickers adapt to the new operational reality. As long as strong demand persists and the U.S. remains the world’s largest market, these criminal organizations will have billions of dollars’ worth of reasons to continue their operations, regardless of the risks.