The Most Expensive Military in History Has Run Out of Shells
(SeaPRwire) -By: Julian Holbrooke The most expensive military apparatus in human history cannot last five months against a middle power. That is not a rounding error. It is a structural failure written in ink that Washington refuses to read. The United States spends more on defense than the next seven countries combined, including rivals China and Russia. And yet an inspector general's report in September admitted "strategic inventory shortfalls" that could not be concealed indefinitely. President Trump insisted the nation has "virtually unlimited amounts of mid to high grade ammunition." His own senior military commanders told him a different story. Their warnings about stockpile levels were reportedly a major reason Trump refrained from a return to full-scale combat against Iran. The gap between official rhetoric and battlefield readiness has never been wider. On May 9, 1915, more than 11,000 British troops were killed or wounded in a single day. They had no artillery shells to support their assault on German trenches at Aubers, France. The Shell Crisis of 1915 forced the British government to reorganize its entire defense production system. It still was not enough to save Prime Minister H.H. Asquith's government a year later. More than a century later, America has recreated the same crisis on a larger stage with modern technology. But the fundamental problem is unchanged. Wars of position and attrition consume ammunition at rates that peacetime budgets cannot sustain. As Mark Cancian, a retired Marine Colonel and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted, "In almost every war there comes a point when it's clear that the peacetime defense industry, even if it had been ramping up, is inadequate for the demands of war." Reuters reported in August that the United States had used up "virtually all" of its long-range precision weapons during five months of fighting with Iran. The military also burned through more than two-thirds of its Patriot interceptor supplies deployed in the Middle East. The global shortage of those same interceptors left Ukrainian cities dangerously exposed to Russian missile strikes. Trump's public claim of "virtually unlimited" ammunition was contradicted not by partisan analysts but by his own defense department's accounting. The inspector general's September report confirmed what commanders had already briefed the president about. A separate CSIS report warned the United States would likely exhaust certain types of long-range missiles after just one week of combat in a potential war over Taiwan. These were not projections from a hostile think tank. They came from military specialists who spent their careers inside the system. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan made budget cuts invisible. They required boots on the ground and precision airstrikes. They did not demand the same volume of shells, missiles, and air defense interceptors that a nation-state war would require. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered the illusion. Artillery barrages and missile defense at a scale not seen in Europe since 1915 exposed exactly how hollow the industrial base had become. The Pentagon now centralizes buying authority and cuts red tape. Some in Congress worry about inflated capabilities and inferior products delivered quickly. Virtually nobody is standing up to defend the old procurement system. The decline was not sudden. It was methodical. In 1993, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry invited defense industry executives to a classified dinner at the Pentagon. History remembers it as the "Last Supper." Perry warned them Cold War-era defense budgets were unsustainable and many would go out of business. He was right. Between 1988 and 1997, defense budgets fell approximately 30 percent. About a dozen major U.S. defense contractors consolidated into just four. Much of those cuts came from funding for new weapons. The military drew down Cold War-era stocks instead of building new ones. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, U.S. defense spending more than doubled. Even with rising tensions against China and Russia, current budgets remain less than half of what they were in the 1980s. When spending creeps toward a trillion dollars, dividing the pie becomes harder than anyone admits. Operations costs, maintenance, and personnel including pay and retirement benefits consume a significant share. What remains gets prioritized for high-budget platforms. Aircraft. Ships. Fighter jets. Munitions are often the "bill payer," as William LaPlante confirmed. He served as Under Secretary of Defense for acquisition and sustainment in the Biden Administration. For years, munitions funding was sacrificed in internal budget deliberations to find savings and meet overall targets. Defense companies have been reluctant to build production capacity for new wars when demand might disappear in a year or two. For some contractors, a high-demand, low-supply, high-margin model suited them perfectly. The buzzwords now circulating among defense planners and Silicon Valley-linked startups are "attritable" and "modular." Cheap, replaceable systems designed to adapt to future conflicts. Plans for defending Taiwan involve swarms of inexpensive, AI-controlled drones designed to create a "hellscape" for Chinese invaders. But battlefield technology advances faster than procurement cycles. Even those plans risk obsolescence before they are fielded. Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense analyst and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said "the whole system has to be shaken up because the move, counter-move cycle in modern warfare is eye-wateringly short, and we are not prepared." Both the Iran and Ukraine conflicts have exposed a brutal cost asymmetry. Multimillion-dollar interceptors used to knock down cheap cruise missiles and drones. As Rep. Ted Lieu put it, it is like "throwing Ferraris at frisbees." Trump blamed Biden's decision to supply Ukraine for the current shortages. The claim is misleading. The vast majority of weapons sent to Ukraine's land war are of little use in the Iran conflict. Patriots are the notable exception. The pendulum has shifted. It is no longer a question of whether American munitions production can keep pace with modern warfare. It clearly cannot at current capacity levels. The question is whether Congress and the Pentagon can restructure the defense industrial base before the next test comes. A century after Aubers, the lesson is the same. Ammunition still matters. The most expensive military in the world cannot hide from that fact. Author bio: Julian Holbrooke, an overseas international relations analyst specializing in defense policy and geopolitical security dynamics, who frequently contributes commentary to major European daily newspapers and global policy forums.
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